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Abstract
Climate change threatens to increase the frequency and intensity of droughts and floods. There are large uncertainties related to
unknowns around the future and society’s responses to these threats. ‘Uncertainty’ as other words with the prefix ‘un’ (unknown,
untold, unrest) often has negative connotations. Yet, uncertainty is manifested in virtually everything we do. To many in science,
uncertainty is akin to error that should be minimised, a lack of knowledge that needs to be rectified. We argue that uncertainty
rather should be embraced as a starting point for discussing pathways to climate adaptation. Here we follow a definition of
‘pathways to adaptation’ as representing a set of proactive changes in the present that move people from a climatically unsafe
place, to positions of safety (self-defined as representing freedom from harm or adverse effect). This article applies an inter-
discursive analytical approach where (un)certainty and (un)safety are used to deepen the understanding around the positions of
people in Senegal, and their livelihoods, with respect to climate hazards. We examine the discursive socio-cultural values active
in the climate adaptive space. Our findings show that people’s adaptive decisions often were not based on climate information,
but on discursive values and emotions that guided them in the direction of responses that felt right. We conclude that acknowl-
edging different understandings and perceptions of uncertainty, and the goal of achieving safety, allows issues of power to be
discussed. We contend that this process helps illuminate how to navigate pathways of adaptation to the impacts of climate
variability and change.
Keywords Climate change . Discourse . Family therapy . Safe uncertainty . Senegal . Socio-cultural perceptions
Introduction
Conversations around how to adapt to climate variability and
change often refer to different understandings of current cli-
mate conditions and future climate change. One widely pub-
lished and well-referenced source of knowledge on climate
change comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). Established in 1988, the IPCC produces reg-
ular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its
impacts and future risks. According to the IPCC, these assess-
ments provide policy-makers with the basis for choosing dif-
ferent options for adaptation and mitigation.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that
it has high confidence that the changing climate will continue
to increase the climate risks of heatwaves, droughts and floods
(IPCC 2014). Here, the IPCC refers to ‘confidence’ as relating
to ‘a synthesis of the evaluation of evidence and agreement’
(IPCC 2014: 6), per the author teams of the IPCC. While risk
is taken as ‘[t]he potential for consequences where something
of value is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain, rec-
ognizing the diversity of values’ (IPCC 2014: 6). Clearly, the
IPCC warnings of increased risks from the impacts of anthro-
pogenic climate change are relevant to a wide range of stake-
holders from policy-makers to decision-takers and those im-
pacted by both climate changes and the policies to address
them. In aiming to provide a scientific basis to develop
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climate-related policies for governments at all levels, the
IPCC is broadly following a ‘speaking truth to power’ framing
of science, attempting to act as an independent and objective
provider of knowledge to policy-makers (Hulme 2010, 2011;
Eriksen et al. 2015; Baldwin 2016). Without going into an
evaluation of the validity of such a role, the IPCC process
involves the conceptualization and communication of the un-
certainty associated with current climate knowledge. In turn,
in a policy world, the IPCC’s discourse1 around uncertainty
and confidence frames the range of options explored and em-
phasis given to them in the resultant decision-making.
While the issue of uncertainty in science has been widely
examined, it is only relatively recently that decision-making
under uncertainty in the arena of climate adaptation has be-
come popularised within academic circles as a subject of re-
search. A number of approaches to understanding and
supporting decision-making under uncertainty have been pro-
posed, including: processual analysis, applied behaviour anal-
ysis and organizational behaviour management, foresight, ad-
aptation pathways, theories of collective action, multiple
streams framework, decision scaling, structured decision-
making, robust decision support, and scenario planning (see
Taylor et al. 2017). While these approaches mainly focus on
the decision-making process, less attention has been placed on
how climate knowledge and its uncertainties are framed from
the perspective of decision-makers. These subjectively de-
fined understandings of climate variability and change, often
in terms of their impact on current livelihoods, vary with in-
dividual values, perspectives, worldviews and beliefs. It is the
intention of this article to present a framework, to be used with
decision-makers, and takers, and scientists, to help open up a
discussion around climate change and pathways to adaptation
by acknowledging these different framings. While doing so,
the article introduces the concepts of (un)safe (un)certainty2 to
frame this discussion. Pathways to adaptation approaches
have been discussed by a number of authors (e.g. Haasnoot
et al. 2013; Wilson 2014; Wise et al. 2014; Fischer 2018). In
particular, Fischer (2018: 237) states: ‘The notion of pathways
provides a nuanced way to consider adaptation in the context
[of] past conditions that have shaped vulnerability, specifically
as a thread within a wider process of societal transition
through interacting cultural, political, economic, and environ-
mental change (Haasnoot et al. 2013;Wilson 2014; Wise et al.
2014)’. In this way, pathways are not seen as static, but evolv-
ing with continued learning and pluralism in response to
dynamic, complex social–ecological contexts (Armitage
et al. 2009). The acknowledgement of the benefit of pluralism
in the process of determining pathways makes explicit the
need to consider multiple sources of knowledge, values, rules
and norms (Fazey et al. 2016).
The IPCC and climate science in general presents a set of
discourses around the issue of climate knowledge and uncer-
tainty. In this article, we use keywords such as (un)safety and
(un)certainty to analyse collective descriptions made around
climate change adaptation by people in Senegal. In doing so,
we introduce a pathway approach that recognises the inherent
subjectivity3 of climate knowledge and attempts to harness
sustainable routes towards climate adaptation (see Armitage
et al. 2009). In the following text, we purposefully blur the
distinctions between climate change and variability, seeing
societal responses to contemporary climate information and
forecasts as a route for adapting to longer term climate change
while recognising that climate change might be sudden, irre-
versible and beyond what is experienced in terms of
variability.
Climate adaptation and uncertainty
The issue of uncertainty lies at the very heart of climate, if not
of all predictive science. At the most fundamental level, shed-
ding light on scientific unknowns is a driving rationale for all
scientific research. Indeed, a lack of certainty may be thought
of as extending to the very basis of science in that theories in
science can only be falsified rather than proved. Within atmo-
spheric sciences, chaos, and by extension uncertainty, are fun-
damental characteristics of how the atmosphere varies and
changes over time. Here, chaos means that even the smallest
perturbations to the atmosphere can exert large impacts on
how the atmosphere evolves over time. First shown by
Edward Lorenz, the atmosphere’s chaotic nature means that
all forecasts of weather and climate must be treated as proba-
bilistic and so contain some degree of uncertainty (Slingo and
Palmer 2010).
Uncertainties in forecasts also arise from a lack of under-
standing of atmospheric processes and how they are represent-
ed by forecasting systems. Forecasting systems can be process
based, statistically based or a mixture of both. Statistical-based
forecasting systems in general use regression-based equations
to represent the large-scale linkages between drivers of the
atmosphere, such as sea surface temperatures and the state of
the atmosphere. Whereas process-based models attempt to
numerically account for processes explicitly, at a smaller
1 In this article, we define discourse as ‘collectively shared domains of state-
ments’. As discourses can interact, complement or compete with one another,
we aim to broaden the linguistic analysis beyond one collective narrative,
attitude or perception (see Foucault 1981 and Fairclough 2003).
2 In this article, we define safe uncertainty as ‘when a lack of certainty of future
climate threats is not seen as limiting to feeling and being secure’ and unsafe
certainty as ‘when certainty (in terms of individuals' understanding of how the
climate will change) puts them in a situation of potential harm’.
3 In this article, we followMorales and Harris (2014) definition of subjectivity
as ‘how one understands oneself within a social context—one’s sense of what
it means and feels like to exist within a specific place, time, or set of relation-
ships’Morales and Harris (2014: 706).
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scale, either from first principles and/or by the means of pa-
rametrizations. Process-based dynamical models try to ac-
count for the chaotic nature of the atmosphere by performing
multiple simulations with small random perturbations applied
to the initial conditions of the simulations.
When we move to forecasting the atmosphere at longer
time scales, the uncertainty of the dynamics of the atmosphere
from chaos is added to by uncertainties in our understanding
of other components of the climate system, such as how the
ocean, biosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere and the sun, change
and interact with each other and the atmosphere. For example,
predicting patterns of volcanic activity, which can cause the
rapid cooling of the planet, is severely limited to lead times of
days to weeks. Uncertainty also arises from not knowing how
the composition of the atmosphere in the future will change,
with different societal pathways giving rise to different emis-
sions and hence atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases and aerosols. Uncertainty in climate projections is fur-
ther magnified when science tries to examine the impact that
future climate changes will have on socio-ecological systems.
This scientific perspective on climate change uncertainty has
been nicely summarised in the work of Wilby and Dessai
(2009) as the ‘cascade of uncertainty’. Three other sources
of uncertainty however add to this cascade: namely, uncertain-
ty over which adaptation responses are chosen to deal with
climate impacts, uncertainty around how effective these ac-
tions will be in mediating these impacts, and possibly most
importantly, how other drivers of change, such as globalisa-
tion and population change will interact with climate change.
This last source of uncertainty is potentially large and unpre-
dictable. For example, agent-based simulations of how migra-
tion flows might evolve with climate change in West Africa
showed emergent behaviour when population growth was al-
so incorporated as a driver of demographic change (Kniveton
et al. 2012).
While the uncertainty of forecasts as pertaining to inaccu-
racies in predicting the evolution of the atmosphere over time
have beenwidely explored, less attention, particularly in terms
of the use of climate information, has been focused on other
dimensions of uncertainty. Specifically authors such as
MacKenzie (1990), Van der Sluijs (1997, 2002, 2005, 2006)
and Stirling (2001) have highlighted that uncertainty is at least
partly socially constructed. This assessment always involves
subjective judgement and value-based assumptions and thus,
uncertainty should be assessed qualitatively as well as quan-
titatively. The social construction of uncertainty of science is
of particular importance when looking at how science is used
to make decisions. As highlighted by Van der Sluijs (2006:
72), the construction of uncertainty can be viewed as ‘the
product of implicit negotiation processes between scientists,
policy-makers and the public’.
Decision-making, in the face of unquantifiable uncertainty
in predicting the impacts of future climate, has highlighted the
use of decision-based heuristics in determining adaptation ef-
forts. These include ‘flexiblity’, so that adaptation efforts can
change as new knowledge emerges, ‘robustness’, as in adap-
tation actions work over a range of climate scenarios, and of
‘low-regrets’, in terms of what is done today is not regretted in
the future (Ranger et al. 2013; Haasnoot et al. 2013;Wise et al.
2014). How people deal with day to day uncertainty, such as
when to plant seeds or when to harvest crops, is highly uncer-
tain and collectively bound. Equally, ideas around what is
considered an appropriate or safe decision in the face of cli-
mate risks is subjective. For example, in the arena of early
warning systems around cyclones, it has been shown that in
some social and cultural contexts, even though a functional
early warning system is in place, the decision to not evacuate
to shelters can still be prevalent among certain sections of a
society. People, for example, explain remaining at home al-
though having received warning messages of an approaching
cyclone, due to religious beliefs (Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016,
2019). This example adds to a widely acknowledged notion
that the barriers or limits to adaptation can be social and cul-
tural (Adger and Vincent 2005; Adger et al. 2009; Nielsen and
Reenberg 2010). In this sense, attitudes and knowledge to-
wards risk and uncertainty becomes critical when trying to
understand why some people manage to adapt while others
do not (Oliver-Smith 1996; Wisner et al. 2004; Dessai and
Hulme 2004). It is however important to acknowledge that
culture, values and religious beliefs do not simply restrict
and create barriers or limits to adaptation. Cultural values
and attitudes rather inform whether people want to adapt,
how they want to adapt, what is worth saving, and what is
worth losing. In this way, analysing people’s attitudes and
values is an effective way to better understandwhat adaptation
means to them. It is also important to think of cultural values
and religion as potential tools for increased disaster prepared-
ness or adaptive capacity. This is for example the case, when
sacred buildings are used as cyclone and flood shelters, or
when influential religious leaders take part in disaster relief
and preparedness programs (Cheema et al. 2014; McGeehan
and Baker 2017; Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2019).
A discursive framework to elaborate
around climate uncertainty in Senegal
Language and text are core fundaments that give meaning,
value and understanding to our social lives and realities. In
this way, they can effectively be analysed to detect changes
and transformations in collectively shared beliefs, attitudes
and perceptions. As people are social actors, they have the
power to influence language and establish relationships be-
tween words, meanings and values through repeated commu-
nication (Foucault 1972, 1981; Fairclough 2003). Key me-
diums of social interaction are spoken and written words. An
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effective way of understanding shared storylines is therefore
through the analysis of discourse (Foucault 1981; Fairclough
2003). Discourses can be thought of as collective spaces in
which people communicate and act according to a common
understanding of collective norms. In other words, they create
and establish knowledge regimes within a social space. People
position themselves and their identity within these collectively
shared spaces. In doing so, they represent a perceived and
interlinked subjective reality that is constantly transformed
through social interactions (Foucault 1972, 1981; Fairclough
2003; Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2018). Climate adaptation can
through this lens be understood as a social process within this
socio-political space (Eriksen and Lind 2009; Eriksen et al.
2015). The discourse lens within this article will help reveal
the multi-level connections influencing people’s decision-
making and the power hierarchies in our Senegalese study
area. This is because discourses—linked to power and
knowledge—embrace particular combinations of words, nar-
ratives and practices that therefore result in specific social
actions (Adger et al. 2001; Peet and Watts 2002; Meunier
and Crane 2018). In this article, we will not attempt to detect
or to identify competing or cooperative discourses, nor carry
out any in-depth critical discourse analysis. Instead, we ex-
plore the discursive meanings and values around a few key
concepts among agricultural stakeholders in Senegal.
The inter-discursive analysis was conducted in the follow-
ing way: (1) we chose to introduce the key concepts of climate
change, (un)certainty and (un)safety through a model of safe
uncertainty (see Fig. 1) within individual interviews and group
sessions; (2) we then analysed the way these concepts were
described or given value and meaning inter-discursively or
through the repeated semantic, grammatical and vocabulary
relationships (see Fairclough 2003 or Ayeb-Karlsson et al.
2018 for a similar approach). In this inter-discursive analysis,
we realised that much of the discussions and descriptions were
aligned around the idea of knowledge and power. We also
noticed that the framing around (un)certainty and (un)safety
was binary structured.4
As explained, discourses—including power and knowl-
edge interactions—regulate people’s adaptive behaviour.
These knowledge regimes refrain people from accidentally
or intentionally stepping outside of the collectively established
social norm. The communicative repetition through spoken
and written language serves as a reminder of what people
should think and how to behave. The qualitative dataset from
Senegal with agricultural stakeholders therefore supports our
understanding of their perceptions and attitudes around cli-
mate variability and change, impacts and adaptation.
To give an example, imagine the case of people dealing
with climatic hazards such as cyclone strikes. Some people
may consider evacuating to the shelter after receiving the
warning message. However, this may not feel like a pathway
towards certainty or safety for all. It is one adaptive pathway
for some to deal with the environmental stress, but it does not
necessarily work for all. A young unmarried woman for ex-
ample, may not find safety in evacuating to the shelter.
Perhaps she decides not to evacuate to a public shelter because
this is seen as an ‘inappropriate space’ for a young unmarried
woman. In this way, it is the social power relations in place
within this discourse that refrain her from evacuating. In some
parts of the world, such as in some areas of Bangladesh, a
woman’s place is at home, she is safe at home, and she should
therefore not necessarily leave the house even though a cli-
matic hazard is approaching (Begum 1993; Alam and Rahman
Fig. 1 Illustration of the
conceptual model of safe
uncertainty, adopted from Mason
(1993: 195), and exemplifies
positions of (un)safe (un)certainty
4 Certainty and safety were described as positive, stable, productive and good,
while uncertainty and unsafety were negative, risky, destructive and bad. This
dual structuring is sometimes referred to as binary opposites, e.g. white and
black, good and bad or feminine and masculine. It builds upon the idea that
people feel a ‘natural’ need to order their reality this way to be able to feel like
they understand the world (Foucault 2000, 2002).
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2014; Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016). As an unmarried woman,
her mind prioritises the knowledge that suggests that if she
gets sexually assaulted in the shelter, on the way to the shelter,
or even is thought by others to have been assaulted, she may
never marry. Instead, she would become an economic ‘bur-
den’ to her family. She feels safer trying to survive the cyclone
at home, than by putting her ‘social status’ at risk in the shelter.
Knowledge, within a discourse, could act constraining or trap-
ping someone into a seemingly (from another perspective)
vulnerable position. Knowledge also determines what people
consider as unsafe and uncertain.
The empirical data analysed was gathered in Senegal5
through 23 in-depth interviews and eight Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs) with about 10–15 snowball sampled par-
ticipants in each (see Table 1). The research sessions were all
conducted in 2016 by local French-speaking researchers that
were accompanied by the authors. The sessions were audio
recorded, transcribed and translated into English.
Observations and notes were also taken throughout sessions
that included interactions between people in the group ses-
sions. The interviewing and group sessions were all carried
out around the topic of climate variability and change, impacts
and adaptation, (un)safety and (un)certainty (see model in Fig.
1). The research sessions were conducted with regional agri-
cultural stakeholders (including farmers, scientists and policy-
makers). All the participants represented an agricultural orga-
nisation in one way or another. Some of them were farmers on
the side, others are farmers involved in policy or research (see
Table 1). In this way, the participants were socio-economically
fairly well off, although they had been through different levels
of financial loss due to the climatic stressors. A few partici-
pants were women, although a vast majority of them were
men. No group sessions were carried out with women only,
yet in some groups, women attended and engaged in the con-
versations. The participants were all within the age of 20 to 69.
The respondents were selected through a form of snowball
sampling based on the AMMA-2050 projects’ institutional
contacts. Further research would be required to engage with
those more marginalised—where we envisage we would re-
ceive a more polarised response.
Similar theoretical frameworks (of discourse, power and
knowledge) have been used to show how identity, space and
subjectivities enable or constrain people’s ability to adapt in
Kenya and Senegal (Eriksen and Lind 2009; Eriksen et al.
2015; Meunier and Crane 2018). These studies illustrate how
people’s behaviour, including their adaptive responses to cli-
matic stress and shocks, are influenced by the social power
relations and knowledge within the adaptive space. In this con-
ception, adaptation strategies are viewed as socio-political pro-
cesses that reveal how individuals and collectives interrelate
with one another as well as with the environmental and social
changes or disruptions. In line with this view, we argue that
there is a need to reframe adaptation policy, practices and anal-
ysis to involve local and alternative adaptation knowledge.
Furthermore, we argue that the inclusion of local knowledge
and meaning enable societies to respond more effectively to
socially created problems and vulnerabilities. We feel that peo-
ple’s perceptions of uncertainty are bound up with the dynamic
outcomes and situations in which uncertainty is expressed. We
particularly posit the idea that different understandings of cli-
mate knowledge can position people along a continuum of
whether the use of this knowledge allows them to be safe,
5 This case study was carried out in Senegal’s Peanut Basin. French colonialist
first introduced peanut plantations here in the nineteenth century, and the West
African country has since then become one of the world’s largest producers.
Around half of Senegal’s cultivated land is dedicated to peanut which has
resulted in soil degradation, erosion and lack of vital nutrients. Other agricul-
tural products grown in the area include millet, cowpeas, sorghum, okra and
tomatoes. The area has recently experienced significant climate-related shocks,
including drought, wind storms, flooding rain and unseasonable temperature
changes.
Table 1 Overview of the
informant’s socio-
economic background
including gender,
occupation and age
Individual
respondents
Gender Male Female
17 6
Occupation
Technical advisers 14 2
Policy-makers 3 4
Farmers
(dual roles)
3 1
Age
20–29 4 1
30–39 2 2
40–49 6 2
50–59 2 0
60–69 3 1
Group respondents
Gender Male Female
57 20
Occupation
Technical advisers 29 8
Policy-makers 16 5
Farmers
(dual roles)
4 6
Other 8 1
Age
20–29 5 0
30–39 26 9
40–49 12 7
50–59 12 4
60–69 2 0
Note that some of the informants carry out
dual occupations, such as farmers also in-
volved in drafting and transforming local-
or regional policy legislations
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unsafe or in a position in between the two. In every day par-
lance, the terms certainty and safety are often considered close-
ly related or even equivalent terms. We however take as a
starting point the possibility that these characteristics are distinct
even orthogonal to each other. This is why we use a conceptu-
alisation of a decision-behaviour space that is contained within
the axes from certainty to uncertainty and unsafety to safety (see
Fig. 1 adopted from Mason (1993: 195) where the spectrum of
certainty to uncertainty pertains to knowledge of climate risks,
and that of unsafe to safe is associated with how one sees one’s
livelihood or outcome of a decision.
The conceptual model of safe uncertainty6 is used widely in
the discipline of family therapy to manage problems, risk and
change (Mason 1993; Vivian-Byrne 2001). The conceptual
framework aligns well with our research problem as it repre-
sents a way of moving away from certainty and the idea that
solutions will solve all things (Mason 1993: 194). In the sphere
of therapy, the space of safe uncertainty is seen as the most
therapeutic or a more ‘reasonable’ emotional state as it allows
new explanations to emerge alongside the current context rather
than the new information competing with a fixed or non-
transformative psychological position (Mason 1993; Vivian-
Byrne 2001). Likewise, in a changing climate, we characterise
the safe uncertainty space as one which promotes dialogue and
learning through the contribution of different stakeholder’s
views with varying knowledge and purposes to form different
pathways to adaptation which are flexible, robust and low-
regrets (Ranger et al. 2013). In this article, we posit that move-
ments within the larger space of uncertainty to certainty and
unsafety to safety requires a recognition of the role of knowl-
edge and power. Uncertainty does not preclude safety, and un-
derstanding someone’s position in this space benefits from dif-
ferent perspectives/sources of knowledge through dialogue.
Clearly, key to this conception is the recognition of the subjec-
tive element of what is considered certain and uncertain, or safe
and unsafe. For example, one person living in an urban hotspot
may define someone-else’s living condition in a climatic high-
risk rural area as highly unsafe or uncertain. However, that very
same person may point out that it is much safer to live in a rural
village than within the urban dangers of a city.
This article will therefore apply the conceptual keywords of
climate change, (un)safety, and (un)certainty to understand dif-
ferent pathways of adaptation in Senegal. In doing so, it high-
lights the idea of safe uncertainty being accepting of uncertainty
and not limiting. This while also acknowledging that power and
knowledge influence the position of someone, a society or an
institution within a collective adaptive space, or discursive
values of how to move (pathways to adaptation) from one
psycho-emotional space to another in the face of climate risks.
Climate uncertainty and adaptive pathways
in Senegal
Rainfall variability in West Africa over recent decades has
been among the most extreme in the world. The drought that
started at the end of the 1960s is now recognised as one of the
strongest climatic signals since meteorological measurements
began (Hulme et al. 2001). The high vulnerability of many in
the region has meant that past climate extremes have led to
high losses in lives and livelihoods resulting in the impover-
ishment and displacement of many. Since the droughts of the
1970s and 1980s, while there has been a partial recovery of the
rains, many urban areas now suffer from an increase in severe
flooding.
While there is a solid physical understanding of the causes
of historical climate variability in the region, there is a large
amount of uncertainty in predicting climate variability at sea-
sonal and longer timescales. Currently, there is no consensus
on how changes in greenhouse gases, land cover and aerosols
will impact future rainfall, in terms of the seasonal total and its
distribution within the wet season. Importantly, in terms of
societal impact, there is limited knowledge of how high-
impact weather (HIW) events may change in the near and
long-term future. This uncertainty, coupled with a weak capa-
bility to plan investments on varying timescales, results in a
paucity of climate knowledge being used as a guide to devel-
opment decision-making.
Applying the conceptual model of safe uncertainty
to climatic risks in Senegal
In this context, the multi-institutional African Monsoon
Multidisciplinary Analysis, AMMA-2050 project aims: (1)
to provide expert judgement on future projections of HIW;
(2) to create tools and methodologies for using these projec-
tions for planning within the agricultural and hydrological
sectors, and (3) to demonstrate the potential for effective ap-
plication of reliable 5–40-year climate projections and associ-
ated uncertainties in regional to local scale decision-making.
One of the focuses of AMMA-2050 is building the resilience
of agriculture to climate change. Based in Senegal, the rele-
vant pilot study in the project aims to establish a planning and
policy framework which bridges the knowledge gap between
climate scientists and the agricultural planning processes.
Involving agricultural key actors (farmers, scientists, policy-
makers), the project has documented and is trialling existing
6 In the ‘conceptual model of safe uncertainty’, safe certainty represents a
utopic state, or an unachievable emotional or psychological position as one
never can be completely certain that they are totally safe. In the area of therapy,
certainty represents the knowing about the condition to be threated while the
movement represents the work of the therapist to move the client towards a
‘better place’. The term safety here refers to containment and protection of the
client, public and staff throughout the movement. In other words, clients will
generally seek help from a position of unsafe uncertainty or unsafe certainty
while believing that the therapist will be able to offer them a position of safe
certainty (Vivian-Byrne 2001: 109).
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and new climate resilient agricultural practices, including col-
laborative cultivar breeding strategies, with the potential to
increase adaptive capacity in the study area that might be
up-scaled to other parts of West Africa.
The following results come from some of the research ses-
sions held with stakeholders from southern and central
Senegal. These areas experience a Sudano-Sahelian climate,
characterised by high temperatures (28.1 °C for 1980–2013)
and low rainfall (474mm for 1980–2013), with the wet season
occurring between mid-June and mid-September (Salack et al.
2011). The area is characterised by a high level of naturally
saline soil and salinized soil due to land degradation (17% of
the total land, see Diome 2015). To adapt to high inter-annual
variability of rainfall, farmers in this area had developed low
risks strategies (low inputs and low but stable yields) that have
placed them in what some might consider a position of safe
uncertainty. However, in the context of climate change with
fears of increasing variability and extreme weather combined
with a desire for improved food security and livelihoods,
farmers of the Peanut Basin are starting to feel, more frequent-
ly, in an unsafe and uncertain space.
To initiate a discussion, the conceptual model of safe un-
certainty (shown in Fig. 1) was drawn and its function ex-
plained to the participants. The authors acknowledged that
there was a potential risk of influencing the participants’ per-
ceptions around the key concepts of (un)safety and
(un)certainty through the examples used to illustrate the mod-
el. The way the researches dealt with this was by:
(1) Using unfamiliar environmental stressors. The hazards
used in these examples, tropical cyclones, do not exist
to a large extent in this region. People here are mainly
dealing with droughts and dry spells.
(2) The conceptual choice of methodology. This study
aimed to capture the discursive meanings and values
around these concepts. In doing so, the researchers in-
troduced these concepts within an open-ended interview
or group discussion, but allowed people themselves to
elaborate, give meaning and deeper describe the socio-
cultural values around the concepts.
To illustrate the function of the model, hypothetical exam-
ples of people in the four positions were given:
a. Safe certainty was illustrated by people living on a hill by
the sea in a flood risk area.
b. Unsafe uncertainty was portrayed by people living at sea
level meaning that the village would be inundated by
storm surges, but they did not know when it might occur.
c. Unsafe certainty was described as people who presently
had never been affected by storm surges, while lacking
knowledge of sea level rise, an intensification of cyclones
with global warming, and the ability to negate these risks.
d. Safe uncertainty was ultimately explained as people living
at sea level, but under the protection of early warning
messages notifying them of the approaching storm surges
and with risk reduction actions available to them.
After explaining the model, the participants were asked to
elaborate and debate around their places and situations. They
were also consulted on how they saw themselves and their
reality fitting into the four positions. These elaborations relat-
ed to the climate risks that they currently faced, as well as
potential future climate impacts on their livelihoods. The par-
ticipants were also asked what changes they envisage that
could help them tomovewithin the four position in the model.
Results from the safe uncertainty sessions in Senegal
The rest of this section will present the results of the research
sessions. According to some participants, salinization of soil
and extreme events were seen as placing them in an unsafe
certainty space as extreme events always happen and saliniza-
tion has always existed. To move from a situation of suffering
due to these issues to a safe certainty space, the participants
highlighted the use of a local development plan that restricts
the use of the salinized land. However, several participants
expressed how such a move towards safety and greater cer-
tainty, while desirable, may not be that easy to realise. Some
even referred to it being a ‘dream’.
Financial capital was referred to as a limiting factor in the
move towards safer certainty. For example, drought- and
flood-resistant crops may ensure a greater degree of certainty,
but these seeds are more expensive and yields can be low.
The problems of food shortages mean that we have very
little to invest when we need to think of how to deal with
dryer or wetter conditions. /…/ The special seeds are
very expensive.
One of the most important ways to reach a safer place was said
to be through ‘better communication’ of ‘information’ or
‘knowledge’. However, the participants sometimes felt that
information was kept from them by the government represen-
tatives for their benefit. In this way, the issue of climate change
ended up playing an important role in the power dynamics
between key actors within the government. As a result, policy
was seen as a constraining factor of pathways to adaptation.
This was because the respondents felt as policy was being
used as a tool against them to control the people, and to in-
crease the benefits for those already in power. In such in-
stances, people explained feeling locked into unsafe places,
or positions with limited adaptation pathway options:
Land [earmarked by the government] for development,
that we could use, has not been touched for years. We
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are not even allowed to graze our cattle there. To arrive
at a safe position even with uncertainty is… [another
participant interrupts]. A dream, these are dreams. I sup-
pose we must as a starting point prioritise how we mo-
bilise [change in speaker].
Improving communication is the best way of making
changes that are effective, only then can we move to a
safer place. Though the information is used by govern-
ment representatives for themselves.
Climate change is transforming the political landscape.
We see departments who should be working together,
because of the changes taking place, still not communi-
cating. Everyone involved is finding their own position.
In terms of why people remain in unsafe uncertainty, respon-
dents cited the lack of forecasts of the wet season onset and end
dates, the post-wet season rain spells, the occurrence of long dry
spells, strong wind events and the rainfall distribution during
the wet season, as increasing agricultural livelihood vulnerabil-
ity. Pathways to move to a safe uncertainty space included
better climate information (knowledge), the establishment of
windbreaks (including the planting of trees and the develop-
ment of agroforestry), the adoption of water retention technol-
ogy such as Zai pits and encouraging plant diversity:
To arrive at a position of greater safety and certainty as in
the box, we need a good strategy for water resource man-
agement, a good way of how to deal with climate infor-
mation, options on the right varieties [of plants], more
information on how to deal with soil conditions, transfer
of technologies, improved techniques for adaptation and
the restoration of ecosystems. Nevertheless, we still face
obstacles including the implications of de-population,
lack of available human resources, and financial con-
straints. There are also issues with the lack of co-
ordination between NGOs /…/ For many years they
[naming the National Government Agencies] provided
lots of information but it is badly used.
Next to technological and financial resources (resources se-
cured through altered power relations), people pointed out that
there was a need for knowledge of how to strategically deal
with climate information. The dissemination of climate infor-
mation was not seen as enough, without the knowledge about
how to use the information. Suspicion existed that the knowl-
edge on how to use climate information was being withheld
by government officials which presented a barrier to the
movement of people to a safer space:
The Meteo [Government Weather Service] rarely give
us information and when they do it is hard to use.
When pushed further on the reasons why information was
seen as irrelevant and difficult to use, many suggested that the
information did not give a complete picture from which they
could make decisions. In these instances, they relied on tradi-
tional knowledge to take decisions. The traditional knowledge
was mostly available to them, even when the meteorological
information was absent.
It was also suggested that to move from a situation of un-
safe uncertainty to one of safe certainty, households, or mem-
bers of households, could migrate. The ensuing discussion
from this suggestion included whether such migration might
however in certain situations lead to people finding them-
selves in unsafe certainty. This was because households, for
example, relocated to slum areas that were prone to urban
flash flooding, or that while reducing climate vulnerability
suffering further economic vulnerability. Participants also
highlighted that migration could perhaps move part of a
household towards greater safety, but position those who are
left behind, especially women, in deeper unsafe uncertainty:
We need alternative thinking, or for the local NGOs to
prepare people to leave the countryside and move to the
city by providing training in non-agricultural activities.
There is an expectation for those that leave to contribute
financially to the family back home, and they find it
extremely hard to survive in the city.
One individual generally takes key decisions. These de-
cisions are often very socio-cultural. The erosion of the
family because of food insecurity—such as the migra-
tion to the cities—can really create problems particular-
ly for women.
The approach outlined above provides a fertile landscape to start
the process of identifying discursive pathways of, and barriers to,
adaptation to climate variability and change as envisaged by
local stakeholders in Senegal. In this conception, the two dimen-
sional conceptual space of safety and certainty is influenced by
the third dimension, power. Power plays a significant role in
shaping the direction of discursive adaptive pathways. The par-
ticipants gave a host of reasons why they and most of their peers
occupied an uncomfortable space of unsafe uncertainty and un-
safe certainty. Interestingly, the certainties that they identified
were issues that many saw beyond or outside of their control:
Many problems that relate to climate we have no control
over. People from the town used to come to us farmers
to buy produce but our yields have gotten smaller and
our prices have gone up. They now go to the town for
their things.
Access to knowledge was also identified as being beyond the
participant’s control. Some farmers, for example, explained
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the inability to move towards safe certainty by not having
direct access to climate information or knowledge. Many still
relied on indigenous knowledge, caught in a space of uncer-
tainty because of conflicting information.
We never talk to the people giving us the information.
We get the information and have to decide what to do.
Too many people tell us different things.
Climate information is provided as only weather [fore-
casts at daily timescales] as this is what the authorities
believe local farmers need.
The information we receive is never specific enough to
our sector.
The participants, also pointed out that decision-makers, such
as regional government agencies, have direct access to knowl-
edge. Among ‘regular people’, those with greater social cap-
ital, due to age or experience, were also better able to access
knowledge:
What we need from the decision-makers is for the [cli-
mate] information to be more precise. We must also
adapt its usage to need.
We need to look at old methods to see what works be-
cause we do not have the skills or expertise to do what is
needed. The Regional Government Agency understands
the importance of giving the information to us producers
but we need to know what to do with it.
The Elders suggested that their fathers and grandfathers
knewwell how to increase their adaptive capacity. Some
people find adaptation much easier only because their
grandfathers passed this knowledge along to them. At a
local level, some farmers were therefore able to detect,
integrate and respond to climate variability quicker than
others.
The participants identified social norms and power relations as
principle factors locking people into an uncertain and unsafe
space. For example, it was mentioned that people reproduce
the behaviour of their families and villages even though it may
be maladaptive. According to the participants, farmers tend to
mistrust or take great ‘caution’ before trusting other members
of the society which can act as a block to the transfer of new
knowledge:
There is a problem with everyone doing different things
to deal with the changing seasons and climate. The way
everyone acts is based on how their families and com-
munities act. This means that people do not always work
together or really have power to buy the seeds they think
they might need.
Trust is critical in the thinking of farmers so not wanting
to ruin this is very important. Farmers are very percep-
tive as part of their role and as such approach all things
with caution. Change is difficult and economics impact
or compounds on their thinking.
The participants also introduced another interesting element in
their description of knowledge. To adopt an adaptive pathway,
and move towards safe certainty, some participants explained
that they do not need climate information but knowledge rel-
evant to themselves. Some respondents described how the
competition between traditional and technological knowledge
confused them. In this way, traditional knowledge was rein-
forced as less valued than technological knowledge:
Sometimes the government tells us things that go
against our indigenous knowledge. What are we sup-
posed to do?We have to do what is best for our families.
As observed, the descriptions around how to move towards
greater certainty and safety were strongly influenced by socio-
cultural values and meanings around knowledge. Even though
financial capital was mentioned as a potential limitation to
reach greater safety and certainty, knowledge, and the feeling
of being at ease with the decisions made, was more important.
If people felt that they had obtained the traditional knowledge
to predict a dry spell or drought, they would simply choose not
to farm, plant drought-resistant seeds, or migrate away tem-
porarily to a place where they could tend to another livelihood
activity. This is interesting, as it illustrates that most and fore-
most it was people’s perceptions around what is safe and how
one can be certain that drove their adaptive responses.
Discussion
This article outlines the development and use of a theoretical
framework encompassing themes of uncertainty and safety to
open up the discussion of pathways to adaptation to the im-
pacts of climate change (Mason 1993; Haasnoot et al. 2013;
Fazey et al. 2016). The Senegalese case study used to illustrate
the approach revealed a variety of perceptions in relation to
climate hazards, (un)certainty and (un)safety. People pointed
out that to be able to adapt, and move from unsafe positions,
the existence of climate information is not enough, while im-
plicitly acknowledging the role of information and knowledge
in adaptation. Access to climate information, or the knowl-
edge of how to obtain climate information, equals power
and can allow people to move towards greater safety.
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The participants described different ways that knowledge
was un-accessible or being kept from them. It was expressed
that those with power sometimes kept the knowledge to them-
selves deliberately for their benefit, and to protect their power
positions. This was, for example, illustrated by the elderly
participants who claimed that former generations used to
know very well how to adapt to the observed climatic chang-
es. This indigenous knowledge was being passed along to
their children which made people more resilient to the chang-
es. However, at the same time, a few participants expressed
how they found it confusing that the meteorological climate
information and indigenous traditions seemed to be clashing.
This narrative potentially illustrates a transformative shift in
the climate adaptation discourse. It is clear that there is a need
for more, or rather ‘better’, climate information and knowledge.
This includes climate data at seasonal and long-term scales, in
order to adapt to the problems presented to people by climate
hazards, but critical local consultations and need assessments
also ought to be carried out (Wise et al. 2014; Ayeb-Karlsson
et al. 2016;McGeehan and Baker 2017). The ideas presented in
this article aim to open up a critical discussion of how we
perceive uncertainty and how it is framed. Currently, uncertain-
ty is continuously framed as something we need to avoid, min-
imise and work against. This is particularly evident and well
documented among the science community (Jasanoff et al.
1998; Keeley and Scoones 2014). In contrast, we posit the idea
that uncertainty in climate knowledge is not only essential to
adaptation, but it is something that broadens the discussion of
alternative knowledge and pathways for adaptation. This is ev-
idently not a new panacea. As a tool for survival, we need to be
able to respond to change quickly. Uncertainty, can be thought
of as the fuel for this trait (Adger and Vincent 2005; Van der
Sluijs 2006). We argue for embracing uncertainty as it may
provide constructive solutions for vulnerable people living un-
der climate uncertainty.
Interestingly, some respondents in this Senegalese study
suggested that it would be impossible to arrive at a safe and
certain space. According to the participants, the continuum of
time with this inherent uncertainty always leaves the door
open to another unsafe possibility emerging. When applied
to the model of safe uncertainty, we can envisage that while
adaptation can move somebody towards a position of greater
safety, the model will also shift with them because of future
uncertainty in terms of climate, policy and societal changes. In
the same way that safe certainty represents a utopic (and un-
reachable) state that people aim for within family therapy
(Mason 1993; Vivian-Byrne 2001), people here acknowl-
edged and expressed similar feelings in the context of climate
change adaptation. This resulted in placing people in a space
of further worries, where they found a need to keep adapting
short-term over and over again.
This flux and constant need to adapt is one explanation of
why uncertainty should not be viewed as constraining, but in
fact enabling by opening up multiple pathways of change.
People’s cultural values, reality or knowledge in Senegal, just
like anywhere else, can be understood as normatively disguised
through social and dynamic repetition. When a person moves
from what they feel is an unsafe position to a safe space, the
decision is based on the values, norms and beliefs reproduced
within the social discourse. This is also why people do not
necessarily describe their home or living situation as unsafe.
People’s perceptions around their reality rules their actions
and behaviours. These beliefs, or perceptions, can determine
if someone migrates away from climatic stress, or decides to
plant drought-resistant crops this year (Foucault 2002; Nielsen
and Reenberg 2010; Meunier and Crane 2018). In other words,
discursive values play an important role in how people respond
to the impact and uncertainty of an upcoming drought. As this
study has shown, most people operate in the grey of uncertainty
for many aspects of their lives—what to grow, when to plant,
when to harvest. In most cases, people’s decisions and actions
are not based on climate information, but on social reproduction
and emotions of what feels right to them.
Conclusion
Uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of climate variability
and change, and the impacts they have on the world. At the
same time, the climate knowledge used to cope with climate
hazards comes from a variety of sources including science,
experience, traditions, socio-cultural norms, observing nature
and beyond. Understanding and using climate information is
conditioned by subjectivities and capabilities. This article has
explored people’s positions, in terms of climate risks and path-
ways to adaptation through the analytical use of keywords
such as knowledge, power, (un)safety and (un)certainty.
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